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Abstract
In this paper we study mergers in two-sided industries. While merg-
ers have been studied extensively in traditional industries, and there
is a large and rapidly evolving literature on two-sided markets, there
has been little work empirically examining mergers in these markets.
We present a model that shows that mergers in two-sided markets may
not necessarily lead to higher prices for either side of the market. We
test our conclusions by examining a spate of mergers in the Canadian
newspaper industry in the late 1990s. Specically, we analyze prices for
both circulation and advertising to try to understand the impact that
these mergers had on consumer welfare. We nd that greater concen-
tration did not lead to higher prices for either newspaper subscribers
or advertisers.
JEL Code: L82, L41.
1 Introduction
In this paper we analyze mergers in two-sided markets. We present a model
that shows that rms owned by competing duopolists may choose to set
higher prices than if both rms were to be owned by a monopolist setting
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prices jointly. More generally, we show that the eects on prices of a merger
in two-sided markets can be ambiguous. We test this model empirically
using data on a series of large mergers in the Canadian newspaper industry
in the late 1990s. Our results indicate that these mergers did not lead to
higher prices for either newspaper subscribers or advertisers.
Two-sided markets have recently been the focus of many research projects.1
Due to the need for two-sided platforms to balance the interests of two dif-
ferent groups of consumers, it is often possible to observe rms in these
industries behaving in ways that would be sub-optimal for traditional rms.
Standard economic predictions do not always hold in these markets. For ex-
ample it is possible to observe rms, even monopolies, consistently setting
price below marginal cost on one side of the platform in order to increase
revenues on the other side. While much work has been done on optimal
price setting in these industries, to our knowledge there has been little work
done in analyzing mergers in such markets.
We provide a model that analyzes price-setting in a two-sided market
where the willingness-to-pay by one side of the platform depends on the
number of consumers, and their characteristics, on the other side. We show
that the prot-maximizing optimum for rms in this market involves setting
price below marginal cost for one group of consumers in order to extract
surplus from the other group. More importantly, we show that it is not
necessarily the case that a monopolist will choose to set higher prices than
competing duopolists on either side of the platform.
Our model shows the circumstances under which joint ownership of two
separate rms actually leads to a lower optimum price than if the two rms
are owned separately. The intuition for this result is that the joint owner
internalizes the eect that raising its price will have on both rms. In equi-
librium, rms use price as a screening mechanism to attract more valuable
consumers. It turns out that the switching consumer, i.e. the reader who is
indierent between purchasing a newspaper from either rm, can have either
a positive or negative net eect on a rm's prots and this in turn induces
the monopolist to set a higher or lower price than competing duopolists.
We then test our results with an empirical application involving news-
paper markets. In general, media industries are good examples of two-sided
markets.2 This is because the media owner has two sets of consumers:
media subscribers such as radio listeners and television viewers, and ad-
1Seminal papers in this area include Rochet and Tirole (2003) and Armstrong (2006).
Anderson and Gabszewicz (2005) survey this literature.
2Other examples of such industries include credit cards, operating systems and HMO
networks.
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vertisers. Advertisers' willingness-to-pay increases in the number of media
subscribers.3
Our application involves studying the eect of a series of mergers in the
Canadian newspaper industry. During the period 1995 to 1999 about 75%
of Canada's daily newspapers changed ownership. Two newspaper chains
in particular, Hollinger and Quebecor, acquired the majority of newspapers
that changed hands. Not only did national concentration gures increase
signicantly, but county-level data indicate that multi-market contact also
increased greatly over this period. However, we have not found any aca-
demic work studying the economic eects of the mergers. This is especially
surprising for an industry that reaches 79% of adult Canadians every week
and generates annual revenues of 3.3 Billion Canadian Dollars (about 2.9
Billion US Dollars).4 In our paper we attempt to ll this gap by exam-
ining whether the mergers aected prices or consumer welfare in the daily
newspaper market.
The issue of media ownership concentration is an especially delicate one
because of concerns over the accurate dissemination of information to con-
sumers and the need to allow room for diering opinions in television, radio
and the print media. This issue recently received widespread attention in
the United States with the proposal in 2003 by the Federal Communications
Commission to relax ownership and cross-ownership laws in the media: rais-
ing the market cap on the reach of television stations owned by the same
conglomerate, and allowing rms to own print and broadcast media in the
same market.
There are two possible eects of an increase in consolidation that can
cause concern- the potential for an exercise of market power by rms (the
usual economic concern from large mergers) and the potential for reduced
diversity of opinions and content from having fewer media sources. In this
paper we examine the rst of these issues. As we describe in the next
section, the Canadian newspaper market experienced huge changes through
a number of acquisitions in a surprisingly short time. Our goal is to examine
whether these mergers led to price changes or had observable eects on
3However, it is not always clear how the number of advertisements aects subscribers'
valuation of the media. While it is safe to assume that subscribers in television and radio
markets value advertisements negatively, the same may not necessarily hold in newspaper
markets. Nevertheless, it is always the case that the media owner needs to keep the
interests of both sets of consumers in mind when setting prices.
4Figures are from the Canadian Newspaper Association and include totals for both
daily and weekly newspapers. Revenue gures are the sum of advertising and circulation
revenues.
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newspaper readership.5
Our results do not support the notion that increased concentration led
to higher prices, either for circulation or for advertising. This is consistent
with our theoretical model of mergers in two-sided markets, where the eect
of a merger on prices for either advertisers or consumers is ambiguous. In
particular, newspapers with changed ownership saw smaller price increases,
or greater price declines than newspapers with unchanged ownership. Addi-
tionally, newspapers in the two dominant chains (Hollinger and Quebecor in
1999, and Canwest and Quebecor in 2002) did not have signicantly dier-
ent price changes from the remaining newspapers. For example, we nd that
circulation prices at newspapers in the dominant chains rose by an average
of between 11 and 14 cents, which was a smaller increase than the corre-
sponding increase of around 15 cents for independent newspapers or those in
smaller chains. Moreover, average advertising prices decreased by 12 cents
per 1000 readers at newspapers in the Hollinger and Quebecor chains, com-
pared with a corresponding rise of 8 cents in the remaining papers. Our
results are robust to examining dierent lengths of time after the mergers;
they also do not show a strong relation between local concentration (as in-
dicated by county level data) and higher prices. These results are reassuring
from the point of view of consumer surplus in that there is no clear economic
eect of increased market power. There does not appear to have been an
exercise of market power in the form of higher prices for either readers or
advertisers.
Our work is related to a number of dierent literatures. As discussed
above, we add to the work done in analyzing two-sided industries. We
also add to the existing literature on mergers, much of which has examined
traditional industries.
Whinston (2006) discusses both the theoretical and empirical evidence
concerning the eect of horizontal mergers. In particular, he nds mixed
theoretical support for the claim that mergers increase price, in part because
of Williamson's claim that mergers might increase eciency, and the fact
that rms are proposing a merger increases the probability that this is the
case. Likewise, Whinston shows there is mixed empirical evidence in the
literature that mergers increase prices, i.e. certain studies nd that mergers
increase prices while other studies do not nd this eect. Recent work
by Nevo (2000) examines the eect of mergers on prices by estimating a
5In Canada, unlike in the United States, there are no special protections accorded to
print media which would stop a merger in order to prevent a loss of diversity of editorial
opinion. Thus, only strictly economic arguments could have been used to prevent the
newspaper mergers in the late 1990's. We discuss this point in more detail in Section 4.
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structural model of demand and conduct and simulating the eect of mergers
on prices. The norm in this research is to assume that the merger will
change the ownership patterns in the industry, but will not alter the type of
equilibrium rms play (such as allowing the possibility of tacit collusion) or
change the preferences of individuals. In contrast, our dierence in dierence
approach can allow for a broader class of eects such as a consumer boycott
of merged papers.
To our knowledge there has been very little work examining the eects of
mergers in two-sided markets. Evans (2002) describes how potential mergers
in two-sided markets may not give rise to the same antitrust concerns as
those in traditional markets. Even if prices were to rise for both sides of the
market as a consequence of the merger, consumers, on both sides, may still
see an increase in surplus.
Evans and Noel (2007) point out the diculties associated with using
conventional methods to analyze mergers in two-sided markets. As they
show, the Lerner Index does not hold in such markets, and merger sim-
ulation models, which are now routinely used in traditional markets, are
misspecied when applied to two-sided or multi-sided markets. Evans and
Noel also perform an analysis of the forthcoming merger between Google and
DoubleClick- perhaps the rst empirical analysis of mergers in two-sided in-
dustries. They show that relying on conventional methods would have led
to signicantly dierent results than using methods that explicitly incorpo-
rate the two-sided nature of this market. Nevertheless, they are limited to
a calibration exercise due to lack of data.
Our paper adds to a vast body of work on media markets, but to a rela-
tively small literature on the eects of concentration in these markets.6 Two
recent studies of concentration in media markets are George (2001), who
studies the eect of ownership concentration on product variety in news-
papers, and Berry and Waldfogel (1999) who study changes in the radio
industry brought about by the US Telecommunications Act of 1996. The
results of both papers suggest that consolidation in media markets increases
product variety. However, neither paper examines the eects of greater
concentration on prices.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows: In Section 2 we construct
a model of mergers in two-sided markets. In Section 3, we describe the
data used for the project. In Section 4 we provide the historical background
pertaining to the newspaper merger wave. Section 5 contains detailed results
showing the eect that the mergers had on observable characteristics of the
6For references on studies of the newspaper industry, see Chandra (2008).
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industry. Section 6 summarizes our ndings and concludes.
2 A Model of Mergers in Two-Sided Markets
We now present a model that illustrates how mergers in two-sided markets
may or may not lead to higher prices. To preserve the later analogy with
our empirical application, consider the newspaper industry. The typical
newspaper publisher has two sets of consumers- newspaper readers and ad-
vertisers. Advertisers' willingness-to-pay for advertising at any newspaper
is generally a function of the number of readers at that newspaper, and their
characteristics.
Before describing the model, we rst develop some intuition for the am-
biguous eect of mergers on prices in a two-sided market. When newspaper
A raises it's price, consumers that stop buying the paper can either stop
buying newspapers altogether (stoppers) or they can switch to purchasing
newspaper B (switchers). When newspaper A and B merge, newspaper A
will internalize the eect of the consumers that start purchasing newspaper
B, i.e. the eect of the switchers.
Switchers can either be more or less valuable to advertisers than stop-
pers. We model stoppers, those consumers who are at the margin between
purchasing a newspaper or none at all, as being more valuable to advertis-
ers than switchers. When newspaper A sets its price, it needs to balance
o losing valuable stoppers with the potential gain of getting rid of switch-
ers. Depending on the relative importance of retaining consumers who stop
reading newspapers versus getting rid of consumers who switch to newspa-
per B, the newspaper might make a loss on switchers, i.e. the consumers
who are indierent between newspaper A and newspaper B. When newspa-
pers merge, they will choose to lower their price since they internalize the
fact that a higher price will induce the switchers to buy newspaper B and
lower its prots.
On the advertising side, our model has an even simpler prediction. Given
the set of readers who buy either newspaper A or newspaper B, the newspa-
per is the monopoly supplier of its readers. All that advertisers care about
is the number and characteristics of readers at a newspaper, not the price of
advertising in the rival newspaper.7 Thus the change in the advertising price
per reader depends solely on the change in average reader characteristics. If
there is an increase in circulation price, this will increase the average value
7In our model, advertisers will not derive any value from advertising in more than one
paper, or switching to the paper located further away from them.
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to advertisers of that newspaper. However, a merger has no direct eect on
advertising price, just an indirect eect through the circulation price.
Consider the following Hotelling model. There are two newspapers lo-
cated at the end points of the line segment on [0; 1]. Denote the newspaper
at 0 by A and at 1 by B. There is a continuum of readers distributed uni-
formly along this line segment. The utility to a reader located at i from
reading newspaper A is given by:
uiA =    pA     i+ 
Here  represents the reduction in utility experienced by readers further
away from the newspaper, pA is the price of newspaper A, and  represents
an idiosyncratic taste for newspapers. We assume that  follows a uniform
distribution given by:
"  U [0; ]
This allows readers' preferences to vary along two dimensions: their
relative taste for newspapers A and B, and their overall taste for newspaper
reading. These two taste parameters are orthogonal to each other. The
assumption that " is dierent from zero is important, since if there is no "
then a newspaper can perfectly screen readers.
The utility from newspaper B is analogously given by:
uiB =    pB     (1  i) + 
Readers will only purchase a newspaper if they gain positive utility from
doing so. If both papers provide positive utility then readers will buy the
paper providing greater utility. Thus we assume away multi-homing, con-
sistent with consumer choices in the Newspaper industry.8;9
Publishers earn revenue from newspaper sales, as well as from advertis-
ing. Advertisers are located at the endpoints 0 and 1 and have a greater
valuation of readers located closer to them. Specically, assume that ad-
vertisers receive prots of q for each consumer that buys a product at their
8Gentzkow (2007) looks at the choice of consumer to read a newspaper online or in
paper, or to do both. While multihoming (consuming multiple newspapers) may be salient
for on and o-line newspapers, there is little evidence that consumers subscribe to more
than one print newspaper.
9Note that we have not modeled newspaper readers' utility as dependent on the amount
of advertising at a given paper. This is mostly to facilitate the algebraic analysis that
follows.
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store. The probability that a consumer located at i who reads the newspaper
will buy the product from an advertiser located at 0 is
P 0(i) =

q
  w
q
 i
Thus readers located further away from the advertiser are less likely to
visit the store. This implies that the advertiser's willingness to pay for a
consumer located at i is given by    !  i. Analogously, the willingness to
pay by an advertiser at 1 for the same reader is    !  (1  i):
Note that there are two important assumptions in this model:
1. Readers and Advertisers have correlated preferences, i.e. readers who
have a stronger preference for newspaper A are more valuable for ad-
vertisers located at 0. This can be interpreted in a geographic sense,
i.e. readers located closer to the city center get more value out of the
city newspaper and are more likely to visit stores in the city. Or we
can interpret this correlation in an intensity of preference sense, i.e.
readers who spend more time with their newspaper are more likely to
notice advertisements in the paper.
2. The preferences of readers and advertisers are not perfectly correlated.
Suppose instead, that the preferences of readers and advertisers are
perfectly correlated. Then the newspaper could screen readers per-
fectly, i.e. pick a price such that only the readers on which it will
make positive prots choose to purchase this newspaper.
The prot of newspaper A from selling to a reader located at i is given
by:
A(i) = pA   c+    !  i
where c is the newspaper's constant marginal cost and the newspaper
can extract all of the advertisers's surplus.
The total prot to newspaper A is given by
A =
Z 1
0
[pA   c+    !  i]P (i = A)di
Here, P (i = A) represents the probability that the reader at i will pur-
chase newspaper A. This probability is a weakly decreasing function of i.
There are three possible cases:
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Case 1 All readers buy a newspaper with probability 1.
This implies that parameter values are such that there is no probability
that a given reader will not purchase a newspaper. In a symmetric equi-
librium this implies that the consumer indierent between newspapers A
and B is located at i = 1=2. Each newspaper sells to half the market with
probability 1. This is illustrated by Panel 1 of Figure 1 below.
Case 2 All readers buy a paper with positive probability, not necessarily
equal to 1.
This corresponds to parameter values which imply a decreasing proba-
bility, as a function of i, that readers will purchase from A and analogously
for B. Nevertheless, it is still the case that the reader located at i = 1=2 is
indierent between purchasing newspaper A or B, even though this reader
may choose not to buy a newspaper. This is illustrated by Panel 2 in the
Figure.
Case 3 Some readers buy a paper with probability zero.
This implies parameter values such that a set of consumers will not
purchase a paper from either A or B. This case is shown in Panel 3.
Note that Case 1 is simply a special case of Case 2, where all consumers
will purchase the newspaper. Moreover, we do not consider Case 3 since it
implies that the market shares of A and B do not overlap, i.e. A and B do
not compete for readers. In this case joint ownership of the two newspapers
will not change the prot maximizing price at either paper and therefore
an analysis of mergers is not interesting. Therefore, we restrict attention to
Case 2.
The probability that a reader at i purchases newspaper A is given by:
P (i = A) =
8>><>>:
1 if i 2
h
0;  pA
i
1  i  pA if i 2
h
 pA
 ;
1
2 +
pB pA
2
i
0 if i 2 12 + pB pA2 ; 1
That is, a certain fraction of consumers will purchase newspaper A no
matter what their value of . Beyond a point, the probability that consumers
buy A decreases with their distance from A, nally reaching zero when their
utility from B exceeds their utility from A.
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Figure 1: 3 dierent cases for the consumer shares.
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We refer to consumers in the interval
h
0;  pA
i
as A's `locked-in' con-
sumers. We refer to consumers in
h
 pA
 ;
1
2 +
pB pA
2
i
as A's `likely' con-
sumers. That is, they clearly prefer A to B, but do not necessarily purchase
A, unless their value of  is high enough. Similarly, B has locked-in and
likely consumers.
Firm A's prot is given by the prot per reader over the range of read-
ers, i; who purchase the newspaper, which can be separated into the region
of i consisting of A's locked-in consumers, where all consumers purchase
newspaper A, and a region consisting of A's likely consumers, where con-
sumers purchase A with probability less than 1 (those with high taste for
newspapers, ).
A =
Z  pA

0
(pA   c+    !i) di+
Z 1
2
+
pA pB
2
 pA

(pA   c+    !i)
"
1  i  pA  
pA pB
2 

#
di
(1)
Figure 2 shows the eect of rm A raising its price. Section (i) of the
graph shows the consumers who will reduce their probability of buying news-
paper A (while still preferring A to B). Section (ii) shows the consumers
who switch from being A's likely readers to being B's likely readers. After
a merger, when choosing the price of newspaper A, the rm must consider
the fact that Section (ii) consumers will switch over to newspaper B. So
a merger will raise or lower prices depending on the protability of those
consumers in zone (ii) for newspaper B.
When newspapers A and B merge, the price of the newspaper A will
now reect the eect of pA on prots of newspaper B. Specically, the sign
of the change in price depends on @B@pA given by:
@B
@pA
=
1
2

pB   c+    !

1
2
+
pA   pB
2

(2)
Thus, the sign of @B@pA depends on the the sign of
 
pB   c+    !
 
1
2 +
pA pB
2

,
the protability of the consumer who is indierent between newspaper A and
newspaper B. Call the consumer located at 12 +
pA pB
2 the switching con-
sumer, i.e. the consumer who is indierent between purchasing newspaper
A and newspaper B. The case where the switching consumer yields positive
prots to the rm is easy to understand. Suppose the market shares are as
in case 1, i.e. all consumers purchase a newspaper. If the newspaper raises
its price, it will lose the switching consumer but no other readers. Thus this
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Figure 2: Eect of an increase of pA on consumer shares.
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price cannot be optimal if the switching consumer gives negative prots to
the rm. In contrast if shares are as in case 2, then when the paper raises its
price it trades o losing its least protable consumer (the switching one) and
losing consumers with lower i but lower taste for newspaper . The prot
on the switching consumer will be greater or smaller than zero based on the
relative value of these \low taste for newspaper consumers" to the advertis-
ers. In particular, a necessary condition for the switching consumer to yield
negative value to the newspaper that they purchase is that the switching
cost of the newspaper, c, is higher that the price charged to readers, pA.
Note that the possibility of newspapers being sold below cost has been
raised by other authors, and there is substantial evidence, both theoreti-
cal and empirical, that many publishers do price their newspapers below
marginal cost in order to maximize prots on the advertising side of the
market.10 This condition is often required in other two-sided markets as
well. Rysman (2004) shows a similar condition in the market for Yellow
Pages. Evans (2002) describes how some credit card companies oer credit
cards for free to consumers, while earning signicant margins from the mer-
chant side of the business. Rochet and Tirole (2003) provide many examples
of two-sided markets where one side serves as the loss leader or subsidized
segment, and the other serves as the prot-making segment; these include
operating systems, shopping malls, newspapers, network television, clubs
and real estate.11 More generally, other network industries{ not just two-
sided markets{ often exhibit the feature that one product is discounted so
as to increase revenues for a related product. For example, companies sell-
ing razor blades and razors, or video game consoles and individual games,
commonly sell the `hardware' at a loss in order to establish an installed base
of consumers who will then be charged higher prices for the `software'.
We can show that, depending on parameter values, it is possible for joint
ownership of these newspapers to result in either higher or lower prot max-
imizing prices. The intuition can be expressed as follows, and is displayed
visually by Figure 2. In the duopoly case, with two competing newspapers,
each publisher sets its optimal price taking into account its revenues and
costs. The benet from lowering its price is the expected gain in circula-
10Examples of studies that have derived this condition and have supplied evidence in-
clude Compaine (1980), Kaiser (2007), Chaudhri (1998) and Argentesi and Filistrucchi
(2007).
11The protable segment typically accounts for the vast majority of the two-sided rm's
revenues or prots. Newspapers typically derive 80 percent of their revenue from adver-
tising, and in 2001 American Express derived 82 percent of its revenue from the merchant
side of the business (see Evans (2002)).
13
tion and advertising revenue from two sources: (i) the increased probability
that A's likely consumers actually purchase A and (ii) the switching of some
readers from being B's likely consumers to being A's likely consumers. The
cost of doing so is the increase in costs that A will incur from its expected
increased sales to switching consumers, as well as the lower revenue from
its stopping consumers. Note, however, that the switching consumers that
will now purchase A are less valuable to advertisers, and therefore provide a
lower advertising revenue to A, than the stopping consumers. At the prot-
maximizing equilibrium, therefore, the gain to A in expected circulation
and advertising revenue from slightly lowering its price does not outweigh
the loss from delivery costs since the switching consumer does not bring in
enough advertising revenue to justify making the sale. Note that neither
publisher will internalize the eect on the other one from changing its price.
A monopolist, however, will internalize the eect that lowering its price
at one paper will have on revenues and costs at the other paper. For certain
parameter values, we can show that the monopolist will choose to set lower
prices at each paper than competing duopolists. 12
A nal note on the demand side. Another change that could occur after
a merger is that rms could change the quality of their newspaper denoted
. Note that an increase in quality has the same impact on consumer shares
as a decrease in price. Thus a rm might want to either lower or raise
quality after a merger (in exactly the opposite way as the change in price)
depending on the protability of the switching consumer.
We now turn to the eect of a merger on advertising price. Typically,
advertising prices are quoted on a per-thousand basis, i.e. it is assumed that
total prices are proportional to the number of readers. The price per reader
for newspaper A (denoted praA ) is given by:
praA =
R 1
0 (   !i)P (i = A)diR 1
0 P (i = A)di
(3)
12Fix the parameters  = 3,  = 4 and c = 5:5. Given these parameters, if we look at
par1 = f! = 9;  = 2:5;  = 6g we nd that the consumer located at 12 yields negative
prots for rms A and B. Therefore when both rms merge, the equilibrium price falls.
Alternatively, for the parameter values par2 = f! = 3;  = 2;  = 4g we nd that the
consumer located at 1
2
yields positive prots and a merger would increase prices. The
dierence between these two parameter values is the fact that par1 has an advertiser
willingness to pay that is steeper than par2, and thus the consumers located in the middle
are less valuable than consumers located at either 0 or 1. MAPLE code for this exercise
is available from the authors by request.
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which can be rewritten as:
praA =
R  pA

0 (   !i) di+
R 1
2
+
pA pB
2
 pA

(   !i)

1  i pA 
pA pB
2



di
 pA
 +
R 1
2
+
pA pB
2
 pA


1  i pA 
pA pB
2



di
(4)
The price per reader for advertisers will increase after the merger if the
price charged to readers increases. If pA increases, then p
ra
A will increase as
well, since the average i of readers of newspaper A goes down. We already
established that the price charged to readers could rise or fall after the
merger depending on the protability of the switching consumer. Thus the
change in the price for advertisers is ambiguous as well.
3 Data
We use data from three sources.13 Editor & Publisher Magazine { which is
the weekly magazine of the newspaper industry { is our source of informa-
tion on newspaper prices, advertising rates, aggregate circulation, and other
newspaper characteristics (such as the number of pages per copy) for every
daily newspaper in Canada. We have collected these data for the years 1995,
1996, 1998, 1999 and 2002. There are, on average 101 daily newspapers in
each year, with a small amount of entry.14
Summary Statistics at the aggregate level are in Table 1; this contains
all daily newspapers in Canada. Note that an observation in this table is a
newspaper-year combination, we have data for the 5 years listed above. The
data show that, during our sample period, the mean weekday newspaper
circulation was 47206 and the median circulation was 18019. While it may
appear that circulation on Saturdays and Sundays is considerably higher
than on weekdays, it is important to keep in mind that not all newspapers
publish on one or both days of the weekend, and those that do tend to be the
larger circulating ones. Conditional on having a Saturday edition, average
daily circulation is over 56,000 copies, and conditional on having a Sunday
13We have made (most) of our data available online so that it is available
to other researchers. We have excluded the proprietary data that was pur-
chased from ABC. The dataset and variable descriptions can be accessed at:
http://strategy.sauder.ubc.ca/chandra/canadadata.html
14For example, during this period the Lloydminster Times became a daily paper (from
a weekly paper), and the National Post was founded.
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Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Weekday Circ. 515 47206 74041 1000 494719
Saturday Circ. 408 68366 106508 2675 739108
Sunday Circ. 139 110750 112708 13693 491105
Average Price ($) 515 0.58 0.15 0.21 1.04
Average Pages 491 39.7 26.3 8 140
Weekday Ad. Rate ($) 511 2.3 3.0 0.4 25.6
Saturday Ad. Rate 399 2.9 3.7 0.5 26.9
Sunday Ad. Rate 137 4.0 2.7 1.0 12.5
Evening Paper 515 0.52 0.50 0 1
French 515 0.11 0.31 0 1
Ad. Rate per 10K readers 511 0.98 0.86 0.22 7.70
Source: Editor and Publisher Magazine.
Table 1: Aggregate Summary Statistics
edition, average daily circulation is over 98,000.15 The mean circulation
price is $0.58 and the mean advertising price per column inch is $2.3 on
weekdays. Just over half the newspapers in the sample are published in the
evening, while 11% are French language papers.16
A supplementary source of data is obtained from county level circula-
tion gures provided by the Audit Bureau of Circulations (ABC). ABC is
an independent, not-for-prot organization that is widely recognized as the
leading auditor of periodical information in North America and many other
countries. Potential advertisers in the print media use the circulation data
provided by ABC as the basis for determining where to allocate their adver-
tising dollars. The ABC dataset contains extremely detailed information on
the circulation of 73 Canadian newspapers for the years 1995-1999. These
73 newspapers constitute the major selling dailies in Canada,17 and the only
ones on which ABC collects information.
We have also matched to each county detailed demographic data: median
15Among those newspapers that publish an edition every day of the week, Saturday
circulation is the highest, followed by Sunday circulation.
16Of the 11 French papers, there are 9 in Quebec, and 1 each in New Brunswick and
Ontario.
17Along with the Globe and Mail as discussed below.
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income, education distribution, population and languages spoken. Specif-
ically, we use the Statistics Canada County Demographic data set for the
1996 Census Year. For each newspaper, we know the counties in which it
circulates and the number of copies sold (weekday and Sunday separately).
Using this dataset, we are able to determine exactly which newspapers com-
pete with each other and how intense that competition is. Relying simply
on aggregate data would not allow us to make these distinctions. In fact,
ABC provided these data at the postal code level for a subset of newspa-
pers but in order to have comparable observations across papers we have
aggregated the postal code level data to the county level.18 Conceptually, it
would seem that merging these two geographies would lead to the loss of a
great deal of data. However, since virtually all postal codes are completely
contained within a single county, we can aggregate postal code data to the
county level.19
Table 2 has summary statistics at the county level; observations in the
rst panel are newspaper-county combinations. The average weekday circu-
lation is 4638 per newspaper per county. We also present measures of the
Herndahl index calculated according to county level market shares in week-
day circulation. These measures are dened in section 5.1. Essentially, we
compute the Herndahl index in each county according to newspaper groups
and then, for each newspaper, weight the value of the Herndahl index in
the counties in which it is present by its circulation in that county. This
provides an indicator of the competitive environment faced by newspapers
and chains, by giving more importance to markets where the newspaper has
a greater fraction of its circulation. The mean weighted Herndahl is 0.61.
Panel 2 of Table 2 provides aggregate circulation gures at the county
level as well as demographic data on population and income. Total weekday
circulation in the average county is 15909. We have observations on 1053
counties pooled across the four years of available data; this translates to
observations on approximately 260 counties annually. The demographic data
reveal a wide variation in county denitions across the country: the mean
county population (15 years and older) is approximately 87,000; however
some counties have populations of well over a million.20
18The level of detail at which circulation data are collected diers usually due to the size
of the newspapers. For papers with very high circulation, providing and auditing accurate
gures at the postal code level is extremely hard, which is why the data are sometimes
only available at the county level.
19In fact more than 98% of postal codes within a forward sortation area (FSA) are in a
single county.
20There are 3 such counties; they include substantial portions of the metropolitan areas
17
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Newspaper-Counties:
Weekday Circ. 3612 4638 16020 1 220930
Saturday Circ. 2007 4719 19020 3 305227
Sunday Circ. 2789 4233 16134 0 188326
Weekly Circulation 3612 31446 108994 9 1598203
Weighted Herndahl 3612 0.61 0.19 0.34 1
(Group)
Counties:
Total Daily Circ. 1053 15909 38366 1 324940
Total Weekly Circ. 1053 107880 262910 62 2353779
Population (15 plus) 257 87590 201999 5680 1959935
Average Income 257 22352 3504 15548 35555
Median Income 257 17046 3108 10211 27136
Source: Audit Bureau of Circulation (ABC) and Statistics Canada.
Table 2: County level summary statistics
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While it is the case that we do not have county level circulation data for a
subset of Canadian dailies, as a practical matter there is no straightforward
solution to this problem, since ABC simply does not collect or provide data
for the 28 newspapers for which we only have aggregate circulation gures.
In the county level analysis that follows, we will restrict our attention to
the newspapers for which we do have county level data. For the most part,
with one major exception, the 28 newspapers without county data are low
circulating, small-town newspapers. The one exception is the Globe and
Mail, at the time Canada's only national newspaper and the second largest
newspaper in the country with an average daily circulation of over 300,000.21
ABC does not collect county level circulation data for the Globe and Mail,
but we were able to obtain circulation gures at the CMA level for this
newspaper.22 We analyze circulation gures specically for the Globe and
Mail in a supplementary note to this paper;23 our results indicate that the
Globe and Mail was not aected by the newspaper mergers; in fact, its
circulation remained quite stable across each province over the period of our
study.
We argue that the remaining newspapers for which we do not have county
level data will not aect our results signicantly. The average weekday cir-
culation of all daily newspapers during our study period is approximately
46,000 while the median is approximately 18,000. By contrast, 18 of the
27 omitted newspapers have a daily circulation of less than 10,000. Of the
remainder, the largest are the Kingston Whig-Standard and the Peterbor-
ough Examiner with approximate daily circulations of 27,000 and 22,000
respectively. We will proceed with the county level analysis under the as-
sumption that the omitted newspapers did not see major changes in their
circulation at the county level, controlling for changes in aggregate circula-
tion; in essence, we will take their county level circulation and market shares
as given, and examine those newspapers on which we do have data. This
method does allow us to say more on this subject than if we were to restrict
ourselves only to the (complete) aggregate data.
Finally, in Table 3, we provide gures on the spread of newspapers across
of Montreal, Toronto and Vancouver.
21The largest circulating newspaper was, and remains, The Toronto Star . Its circulation
was approximately 465,000 over the study period; however it was almost entirely conned
to Ontario.
22CMAs (Census Metropolitan Areas) are geographic areas comprising an urban core
of at least 100,000 plus the surrounding urban areas.
23The supplementary note contains an analysis of the Globe and Mail 's circulation. It
also analyzes the 9 cities in Canada which have more than one daily newspaper publishing
from them. This note is available from the authors.
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Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Median
Newspapers per County 3.4 1.6 1 13 3
Counties per Newspaper 12.3 17.0 1 92 5
Table 3: Dispersion of Newspapers across Counties
counties. The mean and median number of daily newspapers per county are
respectively 3.4 and 3. The mean and median number of counties across
which a newspaper circulates are respectively 12.3 and 5.
4 Background on the Canadian Mergers
In this section we provide some historical background on the wave of newspa-
per mergers in Canada in the late 1990s and also present aggregate statistics
detailing the extent of consolidation in the industry.
The Canadian newspaper mergers can be traced to three large business
acquisitions between 1996 and 2000:
Through a series of deals in 1995 and 1996, Hollinger Inc. acquired a
controlling stake in the Southam group of newspapers (which included 16
daily newspapers) as well as completed the purchase of 25 daily newspapers
from the Thomson group and 7 independent dailies.24;25
On March 1st, 1999, Quebecor Inc. acquired the Sun Media chain of
newspapers, including 14 daily papers, in a $983 million deal. Quebecor
surpassed a bid by Torstar for purchasing Sun Media, but in turn sold four
of its existing dailies to Torstar.26
On July 31st, 2000, Canwest purchased 28 daily newspapers from Hollinger
Inc. The $3.5 billion purchase constituted the largest media deal in Canada's
history. It allowed Canwest to go from having a zero stake in the Canadian
newspaper market to becoming the country's biggest publisher, with 1.8
million daily readers.27
24\Hollinger takes control of Southam: Black leading press baron", The Gazette, May
25, 1996.
25\Newspapers Are Reshued Across Canada", The New York Times, May 13, 1996.
26\It's Ocial: Sun Now Quebecor's", The Toronto Sun, March 2, 1999.
27\New news empire is born: CanWest Global picks up dailies from Hollinger for $3.5
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Table 4 shows that the market share of the top 3 newspapers chains in
Canada rose from 56% to 78% from 1995 to 1999 with Hollinger's share
rising from 0 to 44%.
By 2002, the 3-rm concentration ratio was back down to 67%. Note
that over this time, aggregate newspaper circulation in Canada had been
steadily declining. The 1995-1996 merger wave is a particularly interesting
case study of the eects of media concentration for several reasons. In most
western countries, media industries are subject to more stringent restrictions
on mergers and concentration than are other industries. For instance, in
the United States, the Federal Communications Commission is entrusted
with regulating the communications and media sectors. In contrast, Canada
does not have specic legislation regarding competition in media. Instead
the Competition Bureau regulates newspapers as it does any other product
market:28;29
Thus the issue of insuring diversity in media is substantially sidestepped
by Canadian Competition law. This legal arrangement allowed for the un-
precedented wave of consolidation in the Canadian newspaper industry in
the mid 1990's. It is worth noting that the Canadian newspaper market
was already quite concentrated in the early 1990's. Indeed only 9 cities in
the country at that time had more than one daily newspaper. The merger
wave aected almost all newspaper markets in Canada; between 1995 and
1999, 75 daily newspapers changed hands. Over the same period, the na-
tional Herndahl index rose from 1600 to 2400, indicating a shift from an
industry with a moderate level of concentration to one with a high level of
concentration.
It may appear that national concentration numbers are less important
in an industry where competition tends to be local; for both newspaper
readers and advertisers. Therefore, we now document the scale of the ac-
quisitions using county level data. Since these data are more disaggregated,
they provide a clearer picture of how a given newspaper chain's circulation
overlapped with those of its rivals. In particular, we examine whether there
was greater evidence of multi-market contact following the mergers. If the
acquisitions increased the number of contact points between large national
chains, it may have led to an increase in the probability of tacit collusion;
this theory is referred to as the mutual forbearance hypothesis.30 Table
billion." The Gazette, August 1, 2000.
28\Media concentration is at crisis levels", The Toronto Star, May 2, 1997.
29\The Competition Bureau's Work in Media Industries: Background for the Senate
Committee on Transport and Communications" Competition Bureau, page 6.
30See Busse (2000) and Prince and Simon (2006) for recent empirical studies.
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Ownership Daily Circulation National Market
Share
1995
Southam 1285746 0.26
Thomson 997425 0.20
Torstar 494719 0.10
Sun Media 472054 0.09
Quebecor 421841 0.08
Trans Canada (JTC) 283472 0.06
Others 1058793 0.21
Aggregate National Circulation 5014050
1999
Hollinger/Southam 2211945 0.44
Quebecor/Sun Media 1160572 0.23
Thomson 536346 0.11
Torstar 460654 0.09
Trans Canada (JTC) 257316 0.05
Others 345218 0.07
Aggregate National Circulation 4972051
2002
Canwest 1575936 0.33
Quebecor 973059 0.20
Torstar 671231 0.14
Trans Canada (JTC) 415345 0.09
Hollinger 259523 0.05
Others 918383 0.19
Aggregate National Circulation 4813477
Table 4: Newspaper Ownership by Group
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5 analyzes the eect that the newspaper acquisitions had on multi-market
contact. We use data from 1995 and 1999 and document the extent to which
the two dominant chains at the end of this period{ Hollinger and Quebecor{
increased multi-market contact with each other and with the other two large
chains over this period.31
The gures in parentheses in Table 5 refer to the number of counties in
which the two dominant chains were present; for example, the Hollinger/Southam
group increased its presence from 90 counties in 1995 to 199 in 1999. The
remaining gures refer to the percentage of each chain's circulation counties
in which a rival group was also present in the corresponding year. For exam-
ple, Hollinger overlapped with Quebecor in 28% of the latter's counties in
1995; four years later that number had increased to 74%. The two smaller
groups, JTC and Torstar, saw increases in multi-market contact with one
of the dominant chains but not both. The fraction of JTC's counties that
contained a Hollinger newspaper increased from 37% to 90%, but was un-
changed with respect to Quebecor. The Toronto Star initially had hardly
any overlap with Quebecor, but by 1999 it encountered a Quebecor paper
in 50 of its 51 counties. This was entirely due to Quebecor's acquistions, as
the Toronto Star entered just 4 counties over this period.
These results suggest a greater possibility of tacit collusion in the period
following the acquisitions. This is due not just to greater concentration
as measured by national market shares of circulation, but due to increased
contact points in local markets. Each of the smaller chains greatly increased
its multi-market contact with one of the larger chains, and the two large
groups signicantly increased the number of markets in which they competed
against each other.
5 Results
We now examine empirically the eect on prices of the merger activity de-
scribed in Section 4. We rst present results using aggregate gures for
newspapers across all markets and then examine more detailed, county level
data.
31At this point in time Canwest did not control any newspapers. Additionally, Sun
Media had been acquired by Quebecor.
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Hollinger Quebecor JTC Torstar
Hollinger: 1995 (90) - 0.28 0.37 0.49
1999 (199) - 0.74 0.90 0.55
Quebecor: 1995 (123) 0.38 - 0.97 0.09
1999 (128) 0.73 - 0.98 0.98
Note: Figures in parentheses refer to the number of counties in which each
chain{Hollinger or Quebecor{ was present in the corresponding year.
Table 5: Fraction of Counties with Multi-Market Contact
5.1 Price and Quantity Changes
In this section we examine whether the newspaper mergers had observable
eects on newspapers' aggregate characteristics. Our identication strat-
egy is a dierence-in-dierences approach. We compare various groups of
newspapers: those that changed hands versus those that did not; those in
the dominant newspaper chains versus the rest; and those that competed
in multi-newspaper cities versus those which operated essentially as local
monopolies. Again, because the predictions of the model are ambiguous, i.e.
they depend on parameters of the valuation of advertisers and consumers
that are dicult to estimate, we use the dierence-in-dierence approach to
evaluate the impact of mergers on prices. In particular, if mergers decrease
prices, this suggests that the switching consumer yields negative value to
the rm. Likewise, if mergers increase prices, then the switching consumer
is protable. If there is no eect of mergers on prices, either we are in a
situation where newspapers A and B do not compete for the same readers,
or we are in a situation where the switching consumer yields prots of about
0 to the rm. Note that an important testable prediction of the model is
that the change in the circulation price will be in the same direction as
the change in the advertising price. Thus, if these prices move in dierent
directions, this would invalidate the model.
The standard method for dierence-in-dierences calculations involves
comparing the changes in the means for two groups { the treatment and
control groups { before and after the treatment. The dierence in the means
is identical to the value of the coecient 3 in the following regression:
yit = 0+1posttreatmentt+2treatedi+3posttreatmentt  treatedi+uit
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where posttreatment and treated are indicator variables for the time
period following the experiment and being in the treatment group, respec-
tively.
Notice that we are adopting the language of natural-experiments; how-
ever in reality we do not believe that the treatment and control groups are
randomly chosen representative samples, since rms self-select into these
groups. Nevertheless, since these labels have become commonplace in the
quasi-experimental literature in economics, we shall continue to use them
here.32 Moreover, it is not clear that a truly natural experiment is useful
for a Competition Authority deciding on whether to approve a merger. The
collection of mergers that come before the Competition Authority are never
exogenous since rms initiate mergers. Moreover, mergers which are likely
to increase market power will also be more protable for the merging rms.
In this context, we present an empirical examination of whether newspapers
with greater market power exercised that market power in the form of higher
prices.
For ease of presentation, we will only report the values of 3 and its
standard error in the tables that follow, along with the changes in the means
for each of the two groups.
Table 6 compares characteristics of newspapers that changed hands over
the four year period of consolidation 1995-1999, to those that did not. Here,
the newspapers with changed ownership are considered to be in the treat-
ment group.
It appears to be the case that neither circulation nor advertising prices
at acquired newspapers experienced changes that were signicantly dierent
from those that did not change ownership. In general, average circulation
prices rose slightly and average advertising rates fell slightly for both groups
of newspapers. The fall in advertising prices is related to slight declines in
circulation for both groups of newspapers over this period. Upon examining
advertising prices per 10,000 readers (i.e. normalizing by circulation), it
appears that advertising rates per reader decreased for newspapers with
new ownership, and this change is signicantly dierent from the change for
unacquired newspapers, whose per reader advertising prices rose slightly over
the same period. We also examined whether the two groups of newspapers
had dierent percentage changes in circulation by looking at the dierence in
the logs of daily circulation, but there was no signicant dierence. The fact
that there is no signicant dierence in either circulation or prices between
merged and unmerged newspapers suggests that quality of the newspapers
32See Meyer (1995) for a discussion.
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Unchanged Changed Di-in-Di
Ownership Ownership
Change in Variable Mean Std Dev Mean Std Dev Mean Std Err
Circ. Price 0.13 0.09 0.11 0.10 -0.02 0.02
Weekday Circ. -5952 8525 -2932 4075 3020 1736
Ad rate -0.13 0.94 -0.43 0.67 -0.30 0.20
Av Pages 0.50 7.07 -0.57 5.41 -1.07 1.52
Ad rate per 10K 0.08 0.38 -0.12 0.30 -0.19 0.08
Log Weekday Circ. -0.10 0.06 -0.10 0.09 0.00 0.02
N 26 75
Table 6: Dierence in Dierences estimates for newspapers with changed
ownership, 1995 to 1999
is not likely to have changed either.
In Table 7, we extend the time period of the study by looking at dif-
ferences between newspapers with changed and unchanged ownership over
the period 1995 to 2002. This allows us to examine whether the ownership
changes had a delayed eect; it also allows us to examine the eect of the
Canwest takeovers of 2000. The results of Table 6 continue to hold; it is not
the case that newly acquired newspapers had signicantly dierent changes
in either of the two prices as compared to newspapers with unchanged own-
ership.33 However the results do indicate that the newspapers with new own-
ership had signicantly greater percentage declines in circulation compared
with newspapers that retained their ownership. It is surprising, though,
that this change appears a few years following the takeovers, rather than
immediately following them.
In Tables 8 and 9, we examine whether newspapers that were part of
the two dominant chains in 1999 and 2002, had signicantly dierent price
changes (from their 1995 levels) than the remaining papers. The two dom-
inant chains were Hollinger and Quebecor in 1999 (controlling 67% of the
daily newspaper market) and Canwest and Quebecor in 2002 (with 53% of
the market).
Once again, there are almost no signicant dierences in the changes for
33There are fewer observations with changed ownership in 2002 than in 1999. This
is because we classify newspaper ownership only according to the 7 groups dened in
Table 4. Some papers that were acquired by a chain in the 1996-1998 mergers reverted to
independent ownership by 2002.
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Unchanged Changed Di-in-Di
Ownership Ownership
Change in Variable Mean Std Dev Mean Std Dev Mean Std Err
Circ. Price 0.17 0.12 0.14 0.11 -0.03 0.03
Weekday Circ. -3257 13354 -5989 13355 -2732 2907
Ad rate 0.26 1.44 -0.10 0.67 -0.36 0.27
Av Pages -2.13 12.71 0.48 5.97 2.61 2.43
Ad rate per 10K 0.13 0.49 0.08 0.56 -0.05 0.11
Log Weekday Circ. -0.10 0.13 -0.19 0.29 -0.09 0.04
N 30 71
Table 7: Dierence in Dierences estimates for newspapers with changed
ownership, 1995 to 2002
Others Hollinger/ Di-in-Di
Quebecor
Change in Variable Mean Std Dev Mean Std Dev Mean Std Err
Circ. Price 0.13 0.10 0.11 0.09 -0.03 0.02
Weekday Circ. -5118 7949 -3141 4396 1977 1564
Ad rate -0.27 0.92 -0.39 0.69 -0.12 0.27
Av Pages -1.65 7.10 0.25 5.24 1.90 2.43
Ad rate per 10K 0.05 0.37 -0.12 0.31 -0.17 0.11
Log Weekday Circ. -0.10 0.06 -0.10 0.08 0.00 0.04
N 29 72
Table 8: Dierence in Dierences estimates for Hollinger and Quebecor,
1995 to 1999
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Others Canwest/ Di-in-Di
Quebecor
Change in Variable Mean Std Dev Mean Std Dev Mean Std Err
Circ. Price 0.15 0.10 0.14 0.13 -0.01 0.02
Weekday Circ. -3370 10338 -7933 16716 -4564 2956
Ad rate -0.03 1.03 0.07 0.88 0.10 0.19
Av Pages -1.10 8.86 1.18 7.38 2.28 1.63
Ad rate per 10K 0.01 0.44 0.21 0.65 0.20 0.12
Log Weekday Circ. -0.14 0.16 -0.19 0.35 -0.05 0.06
N 61 40
Table 9: Dierence in Dierences estimates for Canwest and Quebecor, 1995
to 2002
the two groups. The one variable that is signicant (or marginally signi-
cant) is the per reader advertising price. However even in this case it is not
clear what eect the mergers had; the Hollinger and Quebecor newspapers'
per reader advertising prices experienced a greater price decline than the
remaining newspapers in 1999; but the Canwest and Quebecor papers of
2002 had somewhat (though marginally signicant) higher price increases
than the other papers. We also examined percent changes in the variables
of interest, rather than simply looking at the change in levels. We do not
present those results here, other than the percent changes in circulation, but
the results do not point to signicant dierences between any of the pairs
of newspaper groups.
5.2 Results using county level data
Finally, we discuss the results using Herndahl indices generated from county
level circulation data. As discussed above, we create weighted Hernd-
ahl indices that, for each newspaper, weigh the standard Herndahl index
in each county that the newspaper circulates in, by its circulation in that
county, thereby assigning greater importance to counties where the paper has
larger audiences. Therefore, as with a regular Herndahl index, this mea-
sure ranges between 0 and 1, and the higher it is, the less the competitive
nature of a rm's market. We use these measures to examine whether news-
papers that faced a lower level of competition from rival publishers tended
to see greater changes in their advertising or circulation prices. We distin-
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guish between two types of the weighted Herndahl index: Own Weighted
Herndahl (OWH), which calculates market shares based on the circulation
of individual newspapers, and Group Weighted Herndahl (GWH), which
treats the publishing group as the unit of analysis in each county, though
still weighs the Herndahl by each individual paper's circulation. That is,
for newspaper i,
OWHi| {z }
Own Weighted Herndahl
=
P
k
"
circik 
P
j
s2jk
#
P
k
circik
where circik is i's circulation in county k and sjk is the market share of
newspaper j in county k. Similarly, for newspaper i,
GWHi| {z }
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where sgk is the market share of group g in county k.
As can be seen from Table 2, there is signicant variation across news-
papers in this index. For comparison purposes, we have also shown val-
ues of another index, the Own Weighted Herndahl (OWH) which calcu-
lates county level Herndahl indices based on individual newspapers' market
shares rather than the market shares of newspaper chains. This measure is
not expected to change much over time since individual papers did not expe-
rience signicant changes in their market shares. The mean value of OWH
is 0.55 and of GWH is 0.61; these values range from 0.33 to 1. Table 10
shows that the average Group Weighted Herndahl increased from 0.68 to
0.72 from 1995 to 1999. However, this increase in GWH was solely due to
merger activity since OWH did not change over this period.
We estimate dierent versions of the specication outlined in equation
5, which regresses log ad rate per reader of newspaper i in year t on the
Herndahl for this newspaper.
rit|{z}
Log Ad Rate Per Reader
= h Hit|{z}
Herndahl
+ i|{z}
Newspaper Eect
+ it|{z}
Newspaper Trend
+ t|{z}
Year Eect
+it
(5)
We add newspaper xed eects (i) to control for newspaper characteristics,
such as wealthier readers for Le Devoir than the Journal de Montreal, which
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Table 10: Change in Concentration of Canadian Newspapers from 1995 to
1999.
Year Mean Group Weighted Herndahl Mean Own Weighted Herndahl
1995 0.68 0.64
1996 0.69 0.63
1998 0.72 0.64
1999 0.72 0.62
may aect ad rates. We also introduce year eects (t) to account for changes
in the newspaper industry over time. Finally, we add newspaper specic time
trends (i) to the model to control for trends in newspaper ad rates, such
as decreases in the Montreal Gazette's ad rates over time.
Table 11 presents estimates of the eect of increases in concentration (as
measured by the Herndahl) on advertising rates. In all specications, we
include newspaper xed eects. Surprisingly, it seems that concentration
increases advertising rates since the eect of Herndahl on ad rates are
signicantly positive. However, when we control for year we nd that the
estimated eect of concentration on rates falls dramatically, indicating that
newspaper rates are increasing over time for other reasons than changes in
competition. Moreover, when we add newspaper specic time trends into
the model, we nd that concentration has no signicant eect on ad rates.
In fact, in specication III in Table 11, the 95% condence interval on the
eect of an increase in the group Herndahl by 0.1 (well below the mean
increase in group Herndahl over the time period) would be between a 3.0%
decrease and a 1.7% increase in ad rates. Thus, even for the most pessimistic
estimate we would only expect prices to rise by less than 2 %.
In a similar vein, we also examine if cover prices increased at newspapers
in markets which became more concentrated. We use the same specication
for ad rates, detailed in equation (5). Table 12 presents regressions of cir-
culation price on concentration. There is no evidence that concentration
would increase cover prices since the coecient on the Herndahl is not
statistically dierent from zero in any specication. Moreover, these esti-
mated coecients are also economically small, since an increase in the Group
Weighted Herndahl by 0.1 would cause between a 4.5 cent increase and a
3.9 cent decrease in the cover price if we take the 95% condence interval
from column III. Thus we cannot nd evidence that increased concentration
harmed newspaper readers.
These results are consistent with the model that we presented, for either
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Table 11: Did More Concentrated Newspapers Raise Ad Rates? (Dependent
Variable: Log Ad Rate Per 10 000 readers)
Variable I II III
Group Weighted Herndahly 0.434 -0.067 -0.066
(0.137) (0.104) (0.123)
1996 0.088 0.038
(0.015) (0.010)
1998 0.193 0.042
(0.016) (0.010)
1999 0.201
(0.016)
Newspaper Fixed Eects X X X
Newspaper Specic Trend X
Observations 292 292 292
R Squared 0.04 0.52 0.83
Estimated Parameters 1 4 76
Number of Newspapers 73 73 73
y: Group Weighted Herndahl is dened as the Herndahl for a newspaper taking
into account other newspapers owned by the same rm.
the case where the switching consumer yields a prot of about zero to the
rm or the case where readership of newspaper A and B does not overlap
before the merger, which will induce no change in cover price and hence
no change in the advertising rate. Moreover, we nd that ad prices and
consumer prices change in the same direction (in this case no change), which
is a testable implication of the model.
We also attempted to gauge the fraction of the population that was
impacted by the ownership changes. From 1995 to 1999, 229 out of the
256 counties in our dataset experienced an ownership change for at least
one of the newspapers circulating in the county. The total population of
these counties was approximately 97% of the national population. However,
only 58% of readers were impacted by the mergers by having their newspaper
acquire new ownership. This is due to the fact that the acquired newspapers
were, on average, smaller (average circulation of approximately 35,000) than
those that were not acquired (average circulation of approximately 75,000).
This is driven in large part by the fact that Canada's 3 largest newspapers|
the Globe and Mail, The Toronto Star, and Le Journal de Montreal|did
31
Table 12: Did More Concentrated Newspapers Raise Cover Price? (Depen-
dent Variable: Newspaper Cover Price)
Variable I II III
Group Weighted Herndahly -0.158 0.139 0.028
(0.179) (0.181) (0.215)
1996 0.013 0.035
(0.027) (0.018)
1998 -0.104 -0.039
(0.028) (0.018)
1999 -0.085
(0.028)
Newspaper Fixed Eects X X X
Newspaper Specic Trend X
Observations 289 289 289
R Squared 0.00 0.12 0.68
Estimated Parameters 1 4 75
Number of Newspapers 73 73 73
y: Group Weighted Herndahl is dened as the Herndahl for a newspaper taking
into account other newspapers owned by the same rm.
32
not change ownership over this period.
6 Conclusion
In this paper we discussed the eect of mergers in two-sided markets, and
in particular we examined the consequences of the wave of mergers and
ownership changes that took place in the Canadian newspaper industry in
the mid 1990s. Our goal was to focus on the economic eects that are easily
quantiable|the eect on circulation and advertising prices|rather than
on the subjective issue of diversity in media opinions.
We rst built a model of the eect of mergers in a two-sided market.
Since newspapers have an incentive to screen consumers who have low value
to advertisers, it is possible that the switching consumer yields either positive
or negative prots for the rm. Thus a merger in a two-sided market may
raise or lower the prices charged to readers and advertisers. Moreover, in
our model, consumer welfare may increase or decrease after a merger, while
advertiser welfare is unchanged.
We then tested these predictions using data from immediately before and
after the newspaper mergers, as well as more recent data, to infer whether
changes in the competitive environment had observable eects on prices and
circulation. The answer appears to be that the ownership changes did not
lead to higher prices for either set of consumers. Our empirical results are,
therefore, consistent with the predictions of our model: it is not obvious that
increased concentration in two-sided markets would lead to higher prices on
either side of the market.
An important caveat to our results is that we cannot identify the causal
eect of the mergers, since rms self-selected into the treatment and control
groups; indeed the possibility exists that rms with greater market power
following the mergers would have had lower prices had they not merged,
and that they exercised their market power to keep prices at about the
same level as the remaining newspapers. However, from the point of view
of consumers there does not appear to have been an obvious collusive eect
of the mergers, or an exploitation of concentration to raise prices by chains
with market power. Indeed, acquired papers, and those that were part of the
dominant chains, saw smaller price rises or greater price declines than other
papers. Interestingly, there is only weak evidence that the mergers impacted
circulation; as it may have been expected that new ownership could have
an initial adverse eect on circulation, through editorial changes or other
policies which could alienate existing readers.
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Our ndings hold true throughout the period of study, whether we ex-
amine price changes immediately following mergers, or after a 3 year gap.
When we examine more detailed, county level data, there is no support for
the hypothesis that either advertising rates or circulation prices rose for
newspapers in more concentrated markets following the mergers.
Overall we vindicate the Competition Bureau's decision to permit these
mergers since we nd that they left the welfare of both readers and advertis-
ers unaected. Given these results, critics of newsprint consolidation need
to prove that diversity in the Canadian press was adversely aected by these
mergers, since there was no eect of these mergers on prices.
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